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CORPORATE LAW - Piercing the Corporate Veil in New
Mexico: Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-settled legal fiction that corporations have independent
identities separate from their owners.' Corporate assets are owned, and
corporate liabilities are owed, by the corporation rather than the individual
shareholders. 2 This limitation on shareholder liability often serves as the
primary purpose of incorporation. 3 Once incorporated, a corporation is
considered an independent entity endowed with many of the rights and
responsibilities of a natural person. 4 Under special circumstances, however,
courts disregard the separate corporate identity and hold the shareholders
directly responsible for the corporation's liability. This process has been
labelled "piercing the corporate veil."
legal contexts under which
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case in which the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to pierce the
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The issue of piercing the corporate veil commonly arises in a number
of structural settings that pertain to the relationship between the owners
and the corporation. These settings include, but are not limited to, actions
against: (1) a single individual shareholder or small group of shareholders
group of corporations
of a closely held corporation;8 (2) an affiliated
9 or (3) a parent corporation
with a common shareholder or 0shareholders;
with one or more subsidiaries.'
1. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 14-15 (1983). The theory that corporations
are imaginary but legal persons in and of themselves, separate from their owners, goes back as far
as Roman and Canon law. Id.
2. See id. at 344.
3. Id.
4. For example, like natural persons, the United States Constitution protects corporations against
unreasonable searches and seizures, deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law,
and denial of equal protection of the law. Corporations, however, do not enjoy the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1879);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
5. See infra notes 8-34 and accompanying text.
6. 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (1988). For an in depth discussion of Scott, see infra notes
35-89 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 90-106.
8. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carleton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 848 (1972).
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In addition to the structural settings, the notion of disregarding the
corporate entity arises in various legal contexts as well. For example, the
corporate entity itself is usually a taxpayer. Yet, if the owner of a
corporation forms and operates a corporation for the sole purpose of
avoiding or minimizing taxes, as opposed to any other legitimate business
purpose, the corporate entity will be ignored."
In the context of criminal statutory law, the issue of disregarding
corporateness sometimes arises when a state desires to hold a corporation's
officers and directors criminally liable for the corporation's violation of
anti-trust laws.' 2 In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,'3 the plaintiff
filed a Sherman Anti-Trust 4 suit against a corporation for alleged conspiracy with the corporation's officers in restraint of trade. Although the
officers were not named as defendants, the plaintiff wanted the court
to hold the officers individually liable, along with the corporation, for
the corporation's misconduct." The court held 6 that the officers could
not be separated from the corporation because the officers did not act
in their own interest, disregarding the concerns of the corporation.' 7
Because a parent corporation may become a creditor of its subsidiary,
the issue of disregarding corporateness occasionally arises in bankruptcy,
receivership, and corporate reorganization proceedings where the subsidiary has become insolvent' s while owing money to the parent.' 9 Under
these circumstances, the court must determine whether to uphold the
entity, and thereby allow a parent/creditor's claim against the subsidiary,
or to determine that the two corporations are one and the same entity,
and therefore disallow the claim made by the parent. 20 Courts often reach
their decision regarding this issue by applying what is known as the
"fairness" test. 2' This test simply requires a court to base its decision
on the fairness and equities of the case.2

Ii. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).

12. See H.

HENN

& J.

ALEXANDER,

supra note 1, at 365.

13. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
14. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1985 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
15. Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914.
16. Id. "A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and
the general rule is that the acts of [officers] are the acts of the corporation." The court acknowledged,
however, that a corporation and its subsidiaries can be guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.

Id.
17. Id.; see also Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970); Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1969); Cott Beverage Corp. v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F.Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), appeal dismissed, 243 F.2d 795
(2d Cir. 1957) (holding that individual directors, who were persons acting for the corporation within
the scope of their employment, could be held personally liable under the Clayton Act and the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act).
18. See Kapp v. Naturell, Inc., 611 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1979); Bass v. Shutan, 259 F.2d 561
(9th Cir. 1958).
19. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 369-71.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 370-71.
22. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
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The corporate entity is rarely ignored solely for the purpose of benefiting
the shareholder. In Colin v. Altman,24 a corporate landlord sought a
certificate of eviction for a tenant of an apartment owned by the corporation. Pursuant to a New York rent control regulation, the court
could issue a certificate of eviction when the landlord, in good faith,
sought to recover possession of housing accommodations for his own
use because of immediate and compelling necessity. The landlord, who
was the sole shareholder of the corporation owning the apartment, urged
the court to regard him and the corporation as one and the same entity
for the purpose of recovering possession of the rental property. The court
refused, declaring that "[ilt must be obvious that the landlord ... is
an individual owner as distinct from other legal entities. A corporation
.... "25
has no compelling necessity to occupy housing accommodations
The court stated further that "the corporate veil is never pierced for the
benefit of the corporation or its shareholders.''26
The area of law in which the corporate veil issue is most common,
however, is imposition of liability2" for a corporation's obligations resulting
may
from tortious conduct or a breach of contract.28 The injured party
9 In this
corporation.
financed
poorly
a
by
wronged
be a tort victim
situation, the question is typically whether the shareholder has acted
improperly to avoid liability by establishing a "dummy" corporation with
30
insufficient funds to cover potential tort liability.
3' where the issue of disregarding the corporate entity
In contract cases
arises, courts frequently look to the factors which the contracting parties
relied upon, the persons who performed particular obligations, and32 the
parties' intentions concerning responsibility for resulting liability. In
Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc. 33 the New Mexico Supreme Court refused
to disregard the corporate fiction and refused to hold the shareholder
parent corporation liable for its subsidiary's breach of contract. After
acknowledging that disregarding the corporate entity is an equitable remedy in New Mexico, the court declared that only upon a showing that
the parent corporation controls or dominates a subsidiary for an improper

23. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER , supra note 1, at 307.
24. 39 A.D.2d 200, 333 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1972).
25. Colin, 39 A.D.2d at 201, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
26. Id.
27. Injured plaintiffs do not always seek to disregard corporateness for the purpose of overstepping
a financially weak corporation in order to reach the "deep pockets" of its owners. In John Willey
& Son v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), a small corporation merged into a larger corporation,
and the large corporation was held bound by the small corporation's agreement to arbitrate with
a union.
28. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 348-52.
29. See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963).
30. Id. at 532, 367 S.W.2d at 430.
31. See Clark, Piercing The Corporate Veil In Florida: The Requirement of "Improper" Conduct,
16 STETSON L. Rv.59 (1986).
32. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 351.
33. 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (1988).
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purpose will the court ignore the corporate entity and consider the parent
corporation and the subsidiary to be one entity. 4
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE"

AZL Resources, Inc. ("AZL"), an Arizona corporation, was a holding
company which owned several subsidiary businesses throughout the United
States. Included in AZL's holdings were three ski resorts: Baca Grande,
Breckenridge, and Angel Fire. Baca Grande and Breckenridge were separately incorporated in Colorado, and Angel Fire was incorporated in
New Mexico .36 All three resorts experienced financial losses 'from 1974
to 1979. As a result, in October of 1979, Baca Grande entered into a
five-year contract with James Scott to serve as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") of Baca Grande, Angel Fire, and Breckenridge. The contract was executed by S. M. Spangler, the President and
CEO of AZL. Spangler, however, did not sign the contract in his capacity
as president of AZL1 7 Spangler had held a number of high level positions,
including president, with Baca Grande until approximately two weeks
prior to the signing of the contract. When the contract was signed,
Spangler was not the president of Baca Grande, although he did hold
a managerial position with the company. Some of Baca Grande's letterheads, however, represented Spangler to be in the capacity of president.
The arrangement specifically required Scott to devote his full time to
assisting in the development and management of the three resorts. He
was barred from engaging in any other business activities during the
contract period. As of February 1980, however, Scott had not applied
more than two-thirds of his full time under the contract. As a result,
he was relieved as Chairman and CEO of Baca Grande and Breckenridge. 3"
He then filed a contract claim in the Santa Fe County District Court
against AZL, Baca Grande, Breckenridge, and Angel Fire.3 9
Subsequently, on the merits, the jury found that there was a valid
contract between James Scott and Baca Grande and returned a verdict

34. Id. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900; see also Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 100 N.M. 379, 682 P.2d 40
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983); Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd. v. Scalia,
118 Ariz. 439, 577 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1978).
35. Brad Coryell contributed much of the information concerning the facts and history of the
case. Mr. Coryell was one of the trial attorneys retained by the defendants.
36. Interview with Brad Coryell, attorney for defendants. Early in the case, Baca Grande and
Breckenridge moved for summary judgment on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. Their
motion was denied.
37. Id. Spangler also served as CEO of Baca Grande at one time. It is unknown, however,
whether he was CEO of Baca Grande at the time the contract was signed. Upon special interrogatories,
the jury found that the contract was between Baca Grande and James Scott.
38. Id. Scott had previously been relieved of his duties at Angel Fire. He was reassigned the
position of consultant to Baca Grande. However, he rejected the assignment and filed suit in the
District Court of Sante Fe County.
39. Id. The complaint also named Tosco Corporation, Maurice F. Strong, as CEO of AZL,
and S. M. Spangler, as President and CEO of AZL.
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in favor of Scott against Baca Grande for $583,971.00. 40 Baca Grande,
however, did not have adequate funds to cover the damage award. The
court then, sua sponte, concluded that each of the subsidiaries were the
"alter ego" of AZL, disregarded the corporate entity, and held each
defendant jointly and severally liable for the judgment against Baca
Grande.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, declaring that "only under
special circumstances will the courts disregard the corporate entity to
pierce the corporate veil holding individual shareholders or a parent
corporation liable. This is done where the corporation was set up for
fraudulent purposes or where to recognize the corporation would result
in injustice." '4' The court followed the general rule concerning piercing
of the corporate veil, holding that "[t]hree requirements must be satisfied
to obtain this relief: a showing of instrumentality or domination, improper
purpose, and proximate cause.''42 The following sections discuss this
general rule and its application in Scott and other related New Mexico
cases .41
RATIONALE
In Scott,44 the New Mexico Supreme Court announced that there must
be a showing of "instrumentality or domination, improper purpose, and
proximate cause" in order to obtain relief under the equitable remedy
of piercing the corporate veil. The main inquiry in most cases is the
scope of the rule's application. While most courts have no trouble stating
the legal principle with respect to disregarding the corporate entity, they
struggle with the facts of a specific case to define "instrumentality" and
"improper purpose." Thus, the next section highlights some of the
have recognized as "instrumentalities" and "imcircumstances courts
'45
purposes."
proper
IV.

Instrumentality
Instrumentality has been recognized as the most difficult element of
the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil.4 This element requires
a plaintiff to prove that the corporation was not established or operated
in a legitimate fashion to serve its valid goals, but rather functioned
A.

40. Scott, 107 N.M. at 118, 753 P.2d at 897. The jury found that the contract was valid and
that Scott's termination was unjustified. The award of $583,971.00 included the following: $390,466
for Scott's salary; $17,100 for fringe benefits; $3,907 for unpaid expenses; and $172,498 for incentive

compensation.
41. Id. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
42. Id. at 118, 753 P.2d at 897.
43. There will also be various references to cases from other jurisdictions.
44. 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (1988).
45. See Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENvER L.J.
1, 16 (1978). Instrumentality and improper purpose have proved to be the rule's most difficult
elements. This article does not discuss proximate cause in great detail because proximate cause seems
to be presumed when the other elements are met.
46. Id.
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under the domination, control, and for the purpose of the shareholder
or shareholders.4 7 This domination must be more than the general domination that all shareholders exert over their corporations. Additionally,
the domination and control must be substantially related to the transaction
under attack." The difficult question is how much domination and control
is sufficient to render the subsidiary an instrumentality of the parent
corporation.
Although there is no single set of factors which define all of the factors
relating to instrumentality, Professor Powell has provided some guidance.
Powell suggests that a combination of the following factors may indicate
that the corporation is a mere instrumentality of its shareholders:
(a)

The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock
of the subsidiary.
(b) The parent and the subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all of the capital stock of
the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses of
the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the
parent corporation, or no assets except the one conveyed to it
by the parent corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in statements by the
officers, the subsidiary is described as a department of the parent
corporation.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as
its own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary, but take their orders
from the parent corporation in the latter's interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not ob9
served.4

The difficulty is that these factors have been said to be merely "indicia,"
and even the presence of all of these factors will not compel a holding
of instrumentality. In many cases, the presence of some or most of these
factors tends to establish the subsidiary as a mere instrumentality of the
parent corporation and not a separate entity. 50 In other cases, however,
courts find the instrumentality factor satisfied even if most of these
factors are not present." This suggests two things: first, the Powell factors
are by no means a fully satisfactory test for determining instrumentality;

47. Id.
48. See F. POWELL,
49. Id.

PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CoRORA'rlONS

§

6 (1931).

50. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 16.
51. See Caple v. Raynel Camper, Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974)
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2
and second, courts assign various and differing weights to the factors.
In New Mexico, the instrumentality element is referred to as the "alter
ego" doctrine.53 In Cruttenden v. Mantura,5 4 the New Mexico Supreme
Court established the general guidelines for determining instrumentality
in New Mexico. In Cruttenden, the plaintiff served a writ of garnishment
on the Marriott Corporation ("Marriott") 5 for collection of an unpaid
6
debt incurred by an employee of Marriott's foreign subsidiary.3 The
court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that
the foreign subsidiary was the alter ego of Marriott. In making its
decision, the court recognized factors similar to those identified by Professor Powell.5 7 The court noted that the only facts in the record relating
to the relationship between Marriott and the subsidiary were: (1) the
latter was organized under Maryland law as a subsidiary of Marriott;
and (2) all foreign activities which were previously conducted by Marriott
were assigned to the foreign subsidiary. 58 According to the court, these
factors did not establish instrumentality.
Sometimes the court is not as willing to look closely at the actions
of the defendant corporation, but rather looks at what the plaintiff knew
or should have known about the relationship between the contracting
6
parties.5 9 In Southern Exploration Co. v. Wynn Exploration Co., Inc., 0
Southern Union sued R.C. Wynn on a contract between Wynn Oil and
Southern Union. R.C. Wynn was the sole shareholder of Wynn Oil.61
The basis of the plaintiff's argument was that Wynn Oil was the alter
ego of R.C. Wynn and, therefore, the court should disregard the corporate
entity of the former and hold the latter liable on the contract. The court
concluded that because the plaintiff "knowingly" contracted with Wynn
Oil, rather than with R.C. Wynn individually, an asserted inability to
not a basis for relieving
collect all of the judgment from Wynn Oil was
62
made.
knowingly
choice
a
from
plaintiff
the
Southern Exploration demonstrates that a court may scrutinize another
factor when determining instrumentality in contract cases: it may consider
what the plaintiff knew about the party with whom he was contracting.
If the plaintiff was aware that he was dealing with the subsidiary and

52. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 17.
53. See Harlow v. Fibron, 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439,
671 P.2d 1150 (1983); Cruttenden v. Mantura, 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (1982); Scott Graphics,
Inc. v. Mahaney, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1976).
54. 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (1982).
55. Apparently, plaintiff attempted to sue Marriott because there was no jurisdiction over the
subsidiary. Id. at 434, 640 P.2d at 934.
56. Id. The subsidiary was a foreign corporation organized by Marriott for the purpose of
conducting all foreign activities.
57. Id. at 435, 640 P.2d at 935.
58. Id.
59. See Bank of New Mexico v. Northwest Power Products, 95 N.M. 743, 626 P.2d 280 (Ct.
App. 1980).
60. 95 N.M. 594, 624 P.2d 536 (Ct. App 1981).
61. R.C. Wynn also owned Wynn X, a separate corporation. Id. at 597, 624 P.2d at 539.
62. Id. at 600, 624 P.2d at 542.
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not with the parent corporation, the court will be less likely to find the
subsidiary to be the alter ego of the parent. 63
In Scott, the defendants argued that the court should not disregard
the corporate entity of Baca Grande because Scott knew with whom he
was dealing when he entered into the contract with Baca Grande.6 The
New Mexico Supreme Court then reviewed the factors recognized by the
trial court in its determination that each of the three resorts were the
alter ego of AZL. 65 The supreme court, however, did not draw its own
conclusion with regard to the instrumentality issue. Rather, it avoided
the question by stating:
Nonetheless, it is clear that the ownership by one corporation of all
or a majority of the stock of the other, or that the corporations have
common officers and directors, or both, is not sufficient by itself to
render a parent liable on its subsidiary's contract .... Mere control
by a corporation is not enough to warrant piercing the corporate
veil.... [W]e must still determine whether AZL's dominion or control
was used for fraud or other improper purposes."
The New Mexico Court of Appeals stated a similar proposition in Harlow
v. Fibron.67 "[A]ssuming, but not deciding, that the alter ego doctrine
is applicable ....
the dispositive question is whether the three defendants
used [the corporation] for an improper purpose."
This discussion demonstrates the difficulty of determining when control
of a corporation crosses the line and reduces the corporation to the mere
instrumentality of its owners. In fact, courts often skip the instrumentality
inquiry and move to the second requirement-"improper purpose." The
following section discusses what kinds of purposes the New Mexico courts
consider improper.
B. Improper Purpose
In addition to establishing that the subsidiary corporation was a mere
instrumentality of the parent, the piercing the corporate veil rule requires
a showing that the parent used the subsidiary for an "improper purpose." 69
In Scott, the court described "improper purpose" as "[s]ome form of
moral culpability attributable to the parent, such as use of the subsidiary
to perpetrate a fraud.... ,'70 The policy supporting the element of im-

63. This problem is elevated in situations where the plaintiff contracts with a "one [person]
corporation." What should courts do when the corporation and the shareholder are the same person?
The "one [person] corporation" is in a unique position. The law requires the shareholder to treat
the corporation as something apart from himself. A failure to maintain this distinction may result
in creating the impression that the business is a purely personal and individual venture. See Wittman
v. Whillingham, 85 Cal. App. 140, 259 P. 63 (1927).
64. Scott, 107 N.M. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 121-22, 753 P.2d at 900-01.
67. 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983).
68. Id. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43.
69. Scott, 107 N.M. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901.
70. Id.
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proper purpose is that although the instrumentality requirement might
be met, there7 still might not be improper intent on the part of the parent
corporation. '
"Fraud" and "lack of economic substance" are the two major factors
contributing to a finding of improper purpose.7 It is easiest for a plaintiff
to show fraud. A plaintiff can establish fraud by demonstrating that the
parent corporation used the subsidiary to intentionally deceive creditors
or other contracting parties.7 Under New Mexico law, however, proving
fraud is generally difficult because it "requires a false representation with
intent to deceive, and this must be established by clear and convincing
evidence." 74 Additionally, the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that claims for fraud must be plead with particularity.Y
Undercapitalizing a corporation and operating it at a loss show lack
of economic substance.7 6 Merely operating a corporation at a loss may
be insufficient to establish improper purpose." However, when the owners
deceitfully drain all monetary funds from the corporation, thus rendering
it incapable of covering legal liabilities, the improper purpose requirement
is met. 78 Although some courts 9 have held that undercapitalization is one
of the only factors necessary to establish improper purpose, New Mexico
requires more.80 In Scott, there was evidence that the three ski resorts
were financially weak. The court announced, however, that "a party
seeking to pierce the corporate veil must show that the financial setup
. . . is a sham and caused an injustice. Mere proof that the [subsidiary]
is now insolvent is insufficient."'"
In addition, mismanagement resulting in lost profits has also been
shown to be insufficient in establishing improper purpose. In Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney,8 2 where the directors and officers ignored corporate
operations to a substantial degree, the court held "[tihese things in and
of themselves are not enough to warrant disregarding the corporate
entity.' '8a

71. See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 18. In fairness to the parent corporation and in
support of the policy of limited liability, there must be a showing of improper purpose.
72. Id. at 28. Other improper purposes include evasion of statutes, misrepresentation, and
participation.
73. See Clark, supra note 31, at 76.
74. See Harlow, 100 N.M. at 384, 671 P.2d at 45.
75. Sup. Ct. Rules Ann. 1-009(B) (Recomp. 1986) (N.M.R. Civ. P.). It is not clear, however,
whether this statute requires the same standard for allegations of fraud for the purpose of disregarding
the corporate entity. See also Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 89 N.M. 208, 212, 549 P.2d 623,
627 (1976); Unser v. Unser, 86 N.M. 648, 653, 526 P.2d 790, 795 (1974).
76. See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 35.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 34. Some California cases have emphasized undercapitalization to the exclusion of
other factors to justify a finding of improper purpose. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d
576, 364 P.2d 473 (1961); W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 127 (4th ed. 1976).
80. See Scott, 107 N.M. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901; Harlow, 100 N.M. at 383, 671 P.2d at 45.
81. Scott, 107 N.M. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901; see also Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd. v. Scalia, 118
Ariz. 439, 443, 577 P.2d 725, 729 (Ct. App. 1978).
82. 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623 (1976).
83. Id. at 212, 549 P.2d at 627.
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Likewise, in Scott, the court noted that the mere fact that "Baca
Grande lost large sums of money" was insufficient to support a finding
of undercapitalization or any other improper purpose. 4 The court did,
however, suggest the circumstances under which the lack of economic
substance may constitute an improper purpose. "It must be shown that
the losses or mismanagement resulted from fraudulent manipulation of
the corporation."8 1 Here, the requirements of culpability or intent to
deceive arise again.
Finally, the court recognized the legitimacy of "zero balance accounts."
Under this system, surplus from all of AZL's subsidiaries went into a
central bank account controlled by the subsidiaries. As a result, each
subsidiary showed a zero cash balance at the end of each accounting
period. Management chose this form of accounting to enable subsidiaries
to borrow money from the central account rather than obtaining a loan
from a commercial bank. This procedure also eliminated the risk of not
qualifying for loans from commercial banks. The system additionally
required borrowing subsidiaries to repay both the borrowed money and
interest at the market rate. Moreover, the depositing subsidiaries earned
interest on their money. Scott argued that this method of accounting
6
was used to avoid having enough money to pay for potential liabilities.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the use of this form of
accounting was insufficient to satisfy a showing of improper purpose
because AZL did not profit in any way from the use of this type of

accounting.

87

C. Proximate Cause
The general policy supporting the requirement of proximate cause is
that liability resulting from disregarding the corporate entity will not be
recognized unless the plaintiff can prove that damages actually resulted
from the parent corporation's control over the subsidiary for an improper
purpose. Finally, there must be a showing that the control by the parent
corporation and the improper purpose caused the plaintiff some damage. 8
No New Mexico corporate veil cases discuss proximate cause in great
detail.89 Aside from stating this requirement in the rule, the court in
Scott did not offer any discussion of proximate cause. Apparently, the
court regarded this issue as moot because it had already concluded that
there was no improper purpose.
V.

ANALYSIS

In New Mexico, a plaintiff must prove three elements before a court
will disregard the corporate entity for the purpose of imposing liability
84. 107 N.M. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court did not go into detail in explaining why the use of zero balance accounting
alone was insufficient to establish a showing of improper purpose.
88. See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 21.
89. Id. at 22.
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on a shareholder: 90 (1) instrumentality; (2) improper purpose; and (3)
proximate cause. 9' Although it has been suggested that courts have the
most difficulty determining how much control and domination is sufficient
to meet the first requirement of instrumentality, the mere existence of
a parent/subsidiary relationship often satisfies this element. 92 The third
requirement, proximate cause, is rarely discussed by the courts, 93 probably
because it is unnecessary to inquire into the issue of proximate cause if
improper purpose is not established.
Although there has been substantial discussion of instrumentality, and
some discussion of proximate cause, most New Mexico cases focus on
the second element of improper purpose. If the plaintiff can show a
substantial degree of culpability or dishonesty on the part of the parent
corporation, the court is likely to find that the parent corporation used
the subsidiary for an improper purpose.9 ' If the court finds improper
purpose, there is generally no difficulty finding that the other two requirements are also satisfied. 95
Most jurisdictions appear to be unwilling to disregard the separateness
of corporations for the purpose of assigning liability to the owners.96
One of the reasons for this unwillingness is the fact that "piercing the
corporate veil" is an equitable concept 7 Therefore, courts are required
to decide whether or not to pierce the veil based upon fairness, rather
than a particular rule of law. 98 In most cases, courts, after applying the
three elements of the rule, do not find sufficient unfair conduct to justify
disregarding the separateness of corporations."
In Scott, the supreme court concentrated on the improper purpose
requirement for piercing the corporate veil and failed to adequately discuss
the instrumentality and proximate cause requirements. 1 The court proclaimed that neither mismanaging nor undercapitalizing a corporation are
improper purposes.10 ' The court acknowledged, however, that a parent's
use of a subsidiary for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud is an improper
purpose.1 2 The court did not discuss what types of purposes, other than
the fraudulent manipulation of a corporation, may meet the element of

90. See Scott, 107 N.M. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
91. Id.
92. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 16.
93. The research involved in drafting this note revealed no cases or articles offering any significant
discussion regarding the "proximate cause" element.
94. See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 18.
95. In fact, there is often an overlapping of factors recognized in considering instrumentality
and improper purpose. See Harlow v. Fibron, 100 N.M. 379, 383, 671 P.2d 40, 44 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983). "Undercapitalization is considered a factor in
determining whether the alter ego doctrine applies . .. and is also a factor to be considered in
determining ... improper purpose." Id.
96. See generally Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45; Clark, supra note 31.
97. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45, at 2; Clark, supra note 31, at 65.
98. Id.
99. See generally Krendl & Krendl, supra note 45; Clark, supra note 31.
100. Scott, 107 N.M. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
101. Id. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901.
102. Id.
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improper purpose.'0 This fact leaves the corporate lawyer with the impression that a parent corporation's fraudulent manipulation of its subsidiary is the only conduct that will satisfy the improper purpose element.
Because the court did not discuss any other improper purposes, it is
unclear whether the court could have found that AZL used Baca Grande
for an improper purpose and ultimately pierced the veil. '4 If a corporate
attorney follows the guidelines established by Professor Powell 105 relating
to the existence of instrumentality, there are strong indications that Baca
Grande was a mere instrument of AZL. Moreover, there is no question
that had the court found that the elements of mere instrumentality and
improper purpose existed, the court would have also found that proximate
cause existed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There may be a partial explanation for the failure of New Mexico
courts to pierce the corporate veil. The principal purpose of incorporation
is to avoid shareholder liability for the acts of the corporation.' °0 If a
New Mexico court disregards the separateness of a corporation and holds
its owner liable when there is no evidence of any culpable behavior on
the part of the owner, other potential shareholders may be discouraged
from incorporating in New Mexico. New Mexico corporations might also
change their state of incorporation. Relative to other states, New Mexico
currently suffers a dearth of corporations to support its economy. Athough New Mexico Courts have never discussed this concern, it
is probable that this economic concern was considered in Scott and the
other cases involving the issue of piercing the corporate veil.
HARRY DEMETRI CHAMBERS

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 14-15.

